Pathum Thani Political Showdown: Thaksin Shinawatra’s Influence in PAO Election Drama

A political storm is brewing in Pathum Thani, and it promises the kind of drama that would make even the most seasoned viewer of Thai politics sit up and take notice. The stage is set for the Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO) election on June 30, and the players involved are heavyweight champions in their own right.

Picture the ruling Pheu Thai Party, licking its wounds after a crushing defeat by the Move Forward Party (MFP), now gearing up to reclaim its throne. Not to be outdone, coalition ally Bhumjaithai Party is gunning for more territory beyond its usual lower Northeast stronghold, possibly with a nudge and a wink from the MFP.

This election is not just a local matter; it’s a barometer of national political maneuvering. Thaksin Shinawatra, the paroled former premier, made a dramatic entrance into the fray, rallying Pheu Thai’s core supporters—the red shirts—during a monk ordination ceremony hosted by a local political luminary’s family. His impassioned plea to consolidate behind Pheu Thai was the shot heard ’round the province, interpreted as a signal of Thaksin’s determination to catapult Pheu Thai back into political prominence.

Yet, critics argue Thaksin, though not a card-carrying member, wields undue influence over the party, an influence he vehemently denies. In a political landscape where the lines between loyalty and legal peril are blurred, Thaksin walks a tightrope as an erstwhile string-puller, attempting to steer clear of repercussions that might arise from allegedly overstepping his bounds.

But the stakes couldn’t be higher for Pheu Thai. After almost a decade of political irrelevance following the 2014 coup, the party is desperate to rebuild its base. Thaksin is the linchpin in this revival strategy, embarking on a red shirt charm offensive across Chiang Mai, Nonthaburi, Nakhon Ratchasima, and Pathum Thani.

The litmus test for this political reawakening lies in grassroots-level elections like the PAO. Local Administrative Organizations (LAO) serve as stepping stones for aspiring MPs, leveraging influential local figures to build a broad support base. In this Pathum Thani showdown, Pheu Thai has roped in local powerhouses to challenge Pol Lt Gen Kamronwit Toopkrajang, a former PAO chairman and erstwhile Thaksin protégé who now stands as their formidable opponent.

The narrative twist comes in the form of Kamronwit’s evolution from Pheu Thai loyalist to a key Bhumjaithai ally, forging strongholds in Pathum Thani and eyeing expansions up the Chao Phraya River to Ayutthaya. Thaksin’s ire at this perceived betrayal led him to throw his weight behind Charn Phuangphet, the red-shirt candidate of choice for the June 30 poll.

Yet, recent opinion polls by Nida hint at an uphill battle: Kamronwit leads with 31%, while Charn trails behind at 28%, with 17% of voters still undecided. These undecided voters, many potentially MFP supporters, find themselves at a crossroads—torn between Pheu Thai and Kamronwit, the latter running under the local Khon Rak Pathum banner.

The MFP, which spectacularly displaced Pheu Thai in the last general election, opted out of this PAO race, citing time constraints and internal conflicts over candidate selection. Their neutrality, however, doesn’t erase the sting of a perceived betrayal by Pheu Thai, which last year dissolved their alliance to form a government with conservative factions.

In this tangled web of allegiances and ambitions, Kamronwit could indeed emerge as the dark horse, buoyed by potential MFP defectors still nursing grudges against Pheu Thai. Adding another layer of intrigue, if Bhumjaithai aligns with Kamronwit, a new political equation may well be on the horizon.

Switching gears, the Political weather report moves us to the Senate election drama. The Constitutional Court’s recent ruling greenlights the final stage of the Senate contest, yet the Election Commission (EC) can hardly rest on its laurels.

Sections 36, 40(3), 41(3), and 42(3) of the organic Senate election law had been under judicial microscope, with sections covering candidate self-introduction and voting processes being scrutinized. The court upheld these provisions, paving the way for national-level voting on June 26.

Yet, whispers of irregularities—money-for-votes schemes, dubious applicant qualifications—cloud the EC’s credibility. The “endorse first, disqualify later” approach has come under fire, and with 80 complaints already filed by mid-June, the EC braces for a legal maelstrom post-election.

Burapha University’s political analyst Olarn Thinbangtieo suggests that this status quo could prompt unsuccessful candidates to challenge the EC’s practices through the Supreme Court’s Election Division. With a reserve list of 100 potential senators ready to step in, the EC hopes to mitigate post-election fallout. However, when fraud is on the table, even a well-stocked reserve may not be enough.

Legal scholar Jade Donavanik emphasizes that while the court has affirmatively ruled on the constitutionality of the organic law, the EC’s operational efficacy remains in question. For those aggrieved or disenfranchised, the courts offer a potential recourse.

As June 26 approaches, 3,000 candidates vie for 200 Senate seats in Nonthaburi’s Impact Muang Thong Thani. The one-day voting marathon promises official results by July 2, setting the stage for yet another episode in Thailand’s ever-unfolding political saga.